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In his seminal work, Becker [7] argued that with a competitive labor market,
individual workers would be paid their marginal product, and would therefore
be able to capture the entire returns to general training in the form of addi-
tional wages. There is however a range of empirical evidence which ¯nds that
¯rms do seem to provide and pay for general training. The leading explana-
tion for this phenomenon is the that general training induces a larger increase
in productivity than in the wage. Following Pigou, a number of authors such
as Stevens [28] and Acemoglu and Pischke [1] argue that this is possible with
an imperfectly competitive labor market.1 As noted by Acemoglu and Pis-
chke, the key issue is whether the distribution of wages is compressed relative
to the distribution of marginal products arising from general training.2 If this
is the case, i.e. across skill wage di®erentials are compressed, the worker's
return to training is less than the rise in her marginal product. Then the
worker has insu±cient incentives to engage in general training: On the other
hand, the ¯rm does have an incentive to provide general training, as the
wage increases less than the productivity (although poaching externalities
may imply that market provision of general training will be insu±cient).
This explanation is widely used in order to explain the di®erence in training
systems between Germany and the United States or UK. It is argued that
di®erentials between skilled and unskilled wages are lower in Germany, which
provides incentives for employers to ¯nance general training.
In this paper we provide a di®erent explanation for the employer provi-
sion of general training, in the context of a competitive labor market. We
shall argue that employers are sometimes unable to di®erentiate wages within
skill categories according to the ability of the worker. This inability can arise
due to a variety of reasons: for example, the ability of the worker may not
be observable at the time of hiring, and may not be veri¯able subsequently,
1Other explanations include that general and speci¯c skills are complementary (see
discussion and references in Stevens ([29])), asymmetric information (Katz and Ziderman
([20]) and Acemoglu and Pischke ([1])) and matching frictions (Burdett and Smith, [14])
2Bhaskar and To [9] show that under plausible models of imperfect competition, wage
di®erentials can be compressed or magni¯ed relative to skill di®erentials, so that workers
may have either insu±cient as excessive incentives to acquire general training. Dustmann
and SchÄ onberg [15] argue that employer market power is insu±cient to explain training in-
centives in Germany. They argue that union mandated wage °oors interact with employer
market power in providing training incentives.
2so that wages cannot be credibly conditioned on the employer's subsequent
observation. The inability to wage di®erentiate may also depend upon in-
stitutional factors; trade unions may oppose employer discretion in wage
gradations within skill levels and enforce uniformity within skill categories.
If able workers have lower subjective costs of undertaking training (as in
Spence's analysis of job market signaling), the employer provision of general
training is a way for employers to partially tailor wages according to ability.
By providing free training, employers are able to induce a positive selection
of more able workers. In a competitive labor market, all employers will be
forced to o®er subsidized general training, since otherwise they will be left
only with the pool of lower ability workers. If the costs of training are not too
high relative to the productivity di®erential, training will be fully subsidized
by the ¯rms. The subsidized training will induce excessive training relative
to the social optimum, even if training involves a wage premium which is
equal to the increase in productivity caused by training. If fact, if training
works as a signal of higher productivity, the wage premium for trained work-
ers is likely to exceed the increase in productivity caused by training. Yet
our earlier results prevail: in equilibrium ¯rms will o®er subsidized training,
in sharp contrast to the requirement of Acemoglu and Pischke [2], where a
crucial condition is that the wage di®erential is smaller than the productivity
increase caused by training.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the
basic model of labor market competition when worker ability is unobserved
by ¯rms, and shows that ¯rms will pay for training in equilibrium. It also
shows that a minimum wage increases the subsidy to training. Section 3
extends this analysis by considering competition in the market for trained
workers and shows that our basic results continue to be true. The ¯nal
section discusses the empirical evidence and concludes.
2 The Model
We assume that there is a continuum of workers. A worker's productivity (or
ability) equals µ; where µ is distributed on the interval [a;b]; with a strictly
positive density f: We assume that the worker knows her own ability, but
that this is not observable by the ¯rm at the time of the hiring decision.
The worker has a reservation wage r; to abstract from problems of adverse
selection, we assume that r is ¯xed and independent of µ. We also assume
3r < b; since otherwise there can never be any employment.
A ¯rm has constant returns production technology, and the value of its
output is the sum of productivities of the individual workers. We also assume
that there are at least two ¯rms, so that the labor market is competitive.
Our key assumption is that the worker's wage cannot be conditioned on
her ability. In contrast, a training program which is universally o®ered but
induces self-selection does not require such conditioning. The inability to
tailor wages can arise due to a number of reasons:
1. The simplest case is when ability cannot be observed by the ¯rm, as
we have set out above. In this case, clearly the wage cannot be ability
dependent. More realistically, we may assume that ability cannot be
observed by the ¯rm at the time of hiring, but that the ¯rm gradu-
ally gets to observe µ over time, as the worker engages in productive
activity. Nevertheless, if µ is not veri¯able, the ¯rm cannot credibly
commit, at the time of hiring, to raise the worker's wage in line with
her productivity. If the ¯rm were to promise to raise w in line with its
observation of µ; it would have an incentive to claim that µ was low,
in order to reduce its wage payment. That is, the ¯rm su®ers from a
moral hazard problem which makes its promise to raise w in line with
µ not credible.3 In contrast, the ¯rm can easily contractually commit
to a training program, which is available, in principle, to all workers.
2. Considerations of fairness may also constrain inequality in wage setting.
If µ is a subjective measure of performance, a worker may not agree
with the ¯rm's evaluation of her productivity, and may resent being
paid lower wages than other workers whom she perceives as equally or
less able. The importance of such considerations are borne out by eq-
uity theory (Adams, [3]), and also by the evidence on inequity aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, [18], Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman [23]
or Bolton and Ockenfels, [11]. Bewley's [7] survey shows that employ-
ers are wary of adopting internal wage policies which have deleterious
e®ects on worker morale. Marsden, French and Katsuyuki [26] analyze
evidence from a survey on performance-related pay in the British pub-
lic sector services. They ¯nd widespread de-motivating e®ects arising
3It may be argued that the ¯rm's reputational concerns can alleviate this moral hazard
problem, but this possibility maybe limited if outside workers cannot observe the pro-
ductivity of inside workers, and hence cannot verify whether the ¯rm has carried out its
promise.
4from di±culties of measuring and evaluating performance fairly. In
contrast, di®erential bene¯ts from a training program are due to self-
selection by workers, and are consequently unlikely to have negative
morale e®ects. A training program which induces self-selection results
in a fair allocation, in the sense of Foley [17], so that the worker who
does not train does not envy the allocation of the worker who chooses
to train. In contrast, wage di®erentiation according to ability results
in envy. Thus even if ability was observable, employers may prefer to
induce self-selection rather than tailor wages directly to ability, since
this will not generate resentment on the part of less able workers.
3. Considerations of fairness may interact with moral hazard considera-
tions and make wage di®erentiation impossible. The literature on em-
ployer moral hazard in wage setting has pointed out that if the number
of workers is su±ciently large, such moral hazard may be overcome by
tournament schemes where the total wage bill is ¯xed - see, for exam-
ple, Malcomson [24]. However, these schemes require that any worker
should be able to verify the wages paid to other workers, and thus a
worker who is paid less will su®er a loss of status which makes such low
pay doubly unpalatable.
4. Finally, there may be institutional constraints on di®erentiating wages
among workers of equal skill levels. Unions are often opposed to discre-
tion in individual wage setting, and this may prevent the ¯rm tailoring
wages to re°ect di®erences in ability.4 One reason for union opposition
is the subjectivity of performance evaluation. This makes unions fear
that employers can use discretion as a way of punishing workers who
are actively involved in the union. International comparisons show a
clear positive link between high unionization and centralized wage set-
ting and wage compression, (see Blau and Kahn [10] and Wallerstein
[30]).
The key point of this paper is that the ¯rm provides general training as
a way of credibly di®erentiating e®ective compensation in order to re°ect
di®erences in ability. To sharpen the focus on this motivation for providing
4In Norway, the teachers' union has several times publically opposed individual wage
setting. Interviews with personnel managers of unionized ¯rms in India con¯rm that
unions are opposed to managerial discretion in paying bonuses.
5training, we assume that training does not a®ect a worker's productivity
in the current period. However, before we turn to this, consider the case
where ¯rms cannot o®er training. Let ¹ µ denote the mean of µ: In market
equilibrium, each ¯rm o®ers a wage equal to ¹ µ: If ¹ µ ¸ r; all workers will
be employed, even those whose productivity is lower than r: If ¹ µ < r; no
worker will be employed. In either event, ¯rms make zero pro¯ts, re°ecting
the competitiveness of the market.
Now suppose that ¯rms can o®er training. The monetary cost of training
a worker is k: In addition, training entails a non-monetary cost or disutility
to the worker, which depends on her ability, and is denoted by c(µ); where
c is strictly decreasing and di®erentiable. If the worker trains, then she gets
a return R which is exogenous for the moment. That is, R does not depend
upon the ability of the individual worker or on the average ability of the
trained worker. Then the payo® for the worker from choosing to train is
¼(µ) = ¡c(µ) + R (1)
Let µ
¤¤ be the value of µ such that ¼(µ) = k, i.e. the payo® to the worker
is equal to the monetary cost of training. We shall assume in this section
that R coincides with the social return to training, so that µ
¤¤ is the socially
optimal level of training. Fig. 1 illustrates this situation { when the worker
pays for his training in full, only workers with productivity to the right of
µ
¤¤ will choose to train.
We shall assume that each ¯rm o®ers a contract of the type (w;¸), where
w denotes the wage which paid, and ¸ 2 [0;1] is the fraction of the training
cost borne by the worker. We shall assume also that the ¯rm cannot condition
the wage payment on the training decision, i.e. it cannot pay distinct wages
to those workers who choose to train and those workers who choose not to.
The ¯rm might conceivably want to do this; however, we shall assume that
the workers do not have to commit to train at the time that they choose
to work at the ¯rm. Furthermore, if the ¯rm were to directly o®er higher
wages to workers who train then it is possible that workers might sign up
for the training program but not put in any e®ort, thereby not incurring
the subjective cost of training. We shall also assume that the ¯rm has no
special monopoly in the provision of training | the worker can always acquire
training by paying for it outside the ¯rm. So the value of training provision
is no greater than (1¡¸)k; and can indeed be less, for example if the worker
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Figure 1: Ability and the Costs/Bene¯ts of Training
Let us now analyze the training decision of a worker, given that she has
chosen employment in the ¯rm. Clearly, a worker will choose to train if and
only if
¸k · ¡c(µ) + R (2)
Let us assume that the k < ¡c(b) + R, so that the most productive
worker will always choose to train even if she pays the entire cost of training.
Assume also that 0 > ¡c(a)+R; so that the least productive type of worker
will never train, even if training is for free. Under these conditions, for any
¸; there will be a type of worker µ(¸) 2 (a;b) who is indi®erent between
training and not training (see Figure 1). Clearly, the critical value µ(¸) is
decreasing in R - a higher return to training makes less productive workers
also willing to train - but to simply notation we suppress the e®ect of R. The
socially optimally level of training, µ
¤¤, prevails when workers pay the entire
cost of training, i.e. µ(1), such that ¼(µ) = k:





w if µ · µ(¸)
w + R ¡ c(µ) ¡ ¸k if µ 2 (µ(¸);µ
¤¤)
w + (1 ¡ ¸)k if µ ¸ µ
¤¤
(3)
We note therefore that the utility of a worker is a continuous increasing
function her ability as long as ¸ < 1: Observe also that the paying for training
is an ine±cient means of paying workers. If the ¯rm incurs a cost of (1¡¸)k
on training a worker, the bene¯t to the worker equals (1 ¡ ¸)k only if the
worker's ability is greater than µ
¤¤: If µ 2 (µ(¸);µ
¤¤); then the bene¯t to the
worker is strictly less than (1 ¡ ¸), as the worker in this case wouldn't have
chosen training if she had to pay in full.
We ¯rst show that there cannot be an equilibrium with positive employ-
ment where ¯rms do not pay for training. If no ¯rm pays at all for training,
one ¯rm can o®er a selective wage increase by paying for training, thus at-
tracting the more able workers. If it combines this with a reduction in the
wage, it discourages the less able workers, who will not avail of training.
This raises total productivity and more than pays for the small increase in
average compensation. To see this argument more formally, suppose that we
have an equilibrium where all active ¯rms do not pay for training. Since the
market is competitive, they must o®er a wage equal to ¹ µ: Now let one ¯rm,
¯rm A;o®er (w;¸) where w < ¹ µ < w + (1 ¡ ¸)k (implying that ¸ < 1). Let
^ µ denote the type of worker who is indi®erent between the o®ers (¹ µ;1) and
(w;¸): ^ µ must be interior: it must be lower than µ
¤¤ since ¹ µ < w + (1 ¡ ¸)k:
It must also be greater than a since c(a) > R:Therefore the productivity of
the workers who join ¯rm A is given by E(µjµ ¸ ^ µ) > ¹ µ: Now by selecting
(w;¸) such that w + (1 ¡ ¸)k is arbitrarily close to but greater than ¹ µ; ¯rm
A can make positive pro¯ts from this deviation. Thus there cannot be an
equilibrium where ¯rms do not pay at all for training.
Since ¯rms will pay at least partly for general training in any equilibrium
with positive employment, it follows immediately that there is excessive train-
ing relative to the social optimum: since training is subsidized, more workers
will avail of it than when they pay for it themselves.
Let us now turn to a characterization of equilibrium. Let us consider an
equilibrium where all active ¯rms o®er the same package (w;¸). A ¯rm's






(µ ¡ w ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)k)f(µ)dµ (4)






(µ ¡ w)f(µ)dµ (5)
Now we must have that ¼T + ¼U = 0; under Bertrand competition | if
pro¯ts were strictly positive, one ¯rm could raise w slightly and attract all
the workers.
Now it is also the case that either (i) the pro¯ts from training workers are
zero at ¸ or (ii) ¸ is at its boundary value, 0: Otherwise, the ¯rm could reduce
¸ slightly, and get all the productive workers from the other ¯rms. In the
case where ¸ = 0 and ¼T > ¼U; all ¯rms strictly prefer to subsidize training,
and thus all active ¯rms must o®er the same package. In the case where
¼T = 0 at the interior value of ¸; then some ¯rms could o®er training while
other ¯rms do not, since ¯rms are indi®erent between the two categories of
worker. In any event, this possible asymmetry does not a®ect the level of
wages and training subsidy available in the market.
Our main results can be summarized in the following theorem, which is
proved in the appendix.
Theorem 1 Suppose that ¹ µ > r: There always exists a labor market equilib-
rium, which must have positive training subsidies. In any equilibrium ¯rms
make zero pro¯ts, and either training is fully subsidized (¸ = 0) or the ¯rm
makes zero pro¯ts from trained workers (¼T = 0): The extent of training is
greater than the socially optimal level.
The theorem focuses on the case where ¹ µ > r; so that the labor market
is active in the absence of training. However, even if ¹ µ < r, so that in any
equilibrium without training, there is no employment, training may allow an
active labor market. A ¯rm can o®er w < r; w + (1 ¡ ¸)k = r:As long as
E(µjµ ¸ µ
¤¤) > r the ¯rm can make positive pro¯ts by o®ering training.
To illustrate the results in the theorem, let us specialize to an example
where µ is uniformly distributed on [a;a+1];a > 0: Let us also assume that
r = 0: We also maintain the assumptions on the cost of training that ensure
that µ(¸) is interior. Under the uniform distribution, if µ(¸) is interior,
E(µjµ · µ(¸)) = a +
µ(¸)
2 ; while E(µjµ > µ(¸)) = a +
1+µ(¸)
2 : Hence the
di®erence in productivity between the workers who train and those who do
not is 1=2; independent of µ(¸):
9Let us consider ¯rst the case where k < 1=2: We show ¯rst that there
exists a symmetric equilibrium where each ¯rm sets ^ ¸ = 0; so that it pays the
entire training cost. The wage that is o®ered solves the zero pro¯t condition,
i.e.
^ w = a +
1
2
¡ k(1 ¡ µ
¤¤) (6)
To see that this is an equilibrium, note that if a ¯rm reduces the wage
slightly, it will lose all its workers. Also, if the ¯rm raises ¸; it will also lose
all its more able workers. Note also that this is the only possible equilibrium,
since if a ¯rm chooses ¸ > 0; the other ¯rm will attract all the able workers
by choosing a lower ¸: We ¯nd in this equilibrium that ¯rms pay for all the
training, and furthermore, the average productivity of the training workers
exceeds their total compensation, while the average productivity of those
workers who do not train is below their compensation. We also ¯nd that
there is excessive training relative to the social optimum , since µ(0) < µ
¤¤:
Now let us consider the case where k ¸ 1=2: There exists an equilibrium
where each ¯rm pays training costs equal to the expected productivity dif-
ference 1=2, i.e. that ¯rm sets 1 ¡ ^ ¸ = 1=(2k): The wage is set equal to
the average productivity of the workers who do not train, i.e. ^ w = a +
µ(¸)
2 ,
implying that ¯rms make zero pro¯t for both types of workers. Thus, in
this case there is no cross subsidization between those workers who train and
those who do not. Once again there is excessive training since µ(¸) < µ
¤¤,
for ¸ < 1:
2.1 The E®ects of a minimum wage
There is a considerable literature on the e®ects of minimum wages of training.
In competitive labor markets, it is argued that ¯rm ¯nanced general training
is one form of worker compensation. If a minimum wage is imposed, ¯rms
will respond by reducing non-wage bene¯ts such as training. We now show
that this presumption is false once one allows for heterogeneity in worker
ability. Indeed, a minimum wage may increase the equilibrium level of train-
ing in the labor market. The intuition is the following: in a competitive
labor market, minimum wage must be paid for, in the form of higher worker
productivity. Typically, this is achieved by a reduction in aggregate employ-
ment, which raises the marginal revenue product of labor, say by raising the
10product price. Thus the minimum wage raises the productivity of all workers.
This also increases the di®erence in productivity between able and less able
workers. Since able workers are more attractive, ¯rms respond by increasing
the training subsidy.
To see this argument formally, let us consider a situation where ¯rms
initially pays only a part of the training costs, i.e. that ¸ is at an interior
value. (Clearly, if the ¯rm pays in full initially, there is no scope for increasing
training in our setup, and a small rise in the minimum wage will have no
impact.) Our focus is on the e®ect of a minimum wage upon the equilibrium
value of ¸:
A minimum wage will cause rationing in the labor market so that only
a fraction ¯ of the labor force may be employed. As shown above, when
¸ is interior, each ¯rm makes zero pro¯ts on skilled and unskilled workers
separately. Recall at the time of hiring, the ¯rm cannot observe the worker's
productivity. Thus the probability that the ¯rm allocates the job to one
worker rather than another cannot depend upon the worker's productivity.
Therefore rationing will be uniform, in the sense that the probability of any
worker getting a job does not depend on her type. The total level of output,





To capture the e®ect of lower employment induced by a minimum wage,
we extend the model slightly by assuming that the product price p(y) is a
decreasing function of total output. Equilibrium in an unconstrained labor
market corresponds to the case where ¯ = 1; with the corresponding total
output y¤: The revenue productivity of a worker is thus p(y¤)µ: Our previous
analysis has thus implicitly normalized p(y¤) to 1:
A minimum wage will induce a lower level of employment in the labor
market so that output falls and the product price rises. We show that a small
minimum wage (i.e. one which is just above the free market level) leads to a
larger subsidy to training, and therefore a larger fraction of employed workers
undertake training.
Proposition 2 A minimum wage strictly increases the ¯rm subsidy to train-
ing, unless ¯rms are fully paying for training.
Proof. Consider the case where the new equilibrium is also characterized
11by a zero pro¯t condition on skilled and unskilled workers. (The minimum
wage may increase the training subsidy up till 100 percent, ¸
m = 0, in which






where wm denotes the minimum wage, pm the equilibrium price post
minimum wage, and ¸
m the training component of the post minimum wage




m + (1 ¡ ¸
m)k (9)
To prove the Proposition, assume the opposite, that the minimum wage does
not a®ect ¯rms' subsidy, i.e. ¸
m = ¸: In this case workers' choice of whether
to train will not be a®ected, implying that µ(¸
m) = µ(¸): Thus the average
productivity of unskilled workers is unchanged with the minimum wage, and
by the zero pro¯t condition for unskilled workers, pm must rise proportionally














where this inequality follows from the initial zero pro¯t condition that
E(µjµ ¸ µ(¸)) ¡ w¤
p¤ ¡
(1¡¸¤)k
p¤ = 0:(the only di®erence between the two con-
ditions being p¤ < pm.) Intuitively, the minimum wage raises the revenue
productivity of all workers, including skilled workers, by raising the market
price. If the amount spent on training does not rise, then pro¯ts on skilled
workers must become positive. Thus, in equilibrium, the subsidy to training
must also rise in order restore pro¯ts to zero. In the same way, it is straight-
forward to show that if ¸
m > ¸, then the average productivity of unskilled
workers would rise, making it even more pro¯table to hire skilled workers,
thus making ¯rms reduce ¸
m.
Our results are consistent with the ¯ndings of Arulampalam. Booth and
Bryan [4], who ¯nd no evidence that minimum wages reduced ¯rm provision
of training. They also ¯nd some evidence that minimum wages increase the
level of training provided by ¯rms.
123 Training, Signaling and Labor Market Com-
petition
We have so far assumed that the worker's return to ability (R) is exogenous,
and unrelated to her ability, and that this coincides with the social return.
This implies that the worker is entirely able to capture the increase in pro-
ductivity due to general training. This assumption has been in order to focus
attention on the main point of the paper, since other work has already argued
that the training ¯rm will have an incentive to pay for general training if it is
able to capture part of the return. We now consider a dynamic model, with
two periods. The basic model described in the previous section constitutes
the ¯rst period. In the second period, ¯rms are assumed not to o®er any
training. Workers who did not receive any training in period one (which we
shall refer to as unskilled), have unchanged productivity µ, while workers
who did receive training in period one (skilled workers), have a higher pro-
ductivity level °(µ) > µ: Thus the social return to training for worker of type
µ is °(µ) ¡ µ: We assume that the return to training is non-decreasing in µ:
If it is strictly increasing, then we have complementarity between skills and
ability, as is assumed by Acemoglu and Pischke [1] | indeed, in their model,
this assumption is essential if ¯rms are to provide training. However, we also
allow for the possibility that °(µ)¡µ is constant and independent of µ: That
is, we allow for the possibility that °(µ) is separable in ability and training,
and can be written as µ + Z; where Z is constant and independent of µ:
We shall consider three alternative scenarios for period two, based on
di®erent assumptions concerning the observability of individual ability, by
the ¯rm which provides training and outside ¯rms. This will determine the
nature of competition in the labor market.
3.1 Ability observed by all ¯rms
Let us ¯rst consider the case where individual ability is common knowledge
between employers in period two, and where ¯rms can di®erentiate wages
fully between individuals, without any constraints. These assumptions, es-
pecially with regard to information, are somewhat unrealistic, but the case
is nevertheless useful as a benchmark. It is then straightforward to see that
a standard competitive equilibrium prevails in period two. All workers with
13productivity above their reservation wage are employed. All employed work-
ers are paid equal to their productivity, i.e. for unskilled workers wU = µ,
while for skilled workers, wS = °(µ):The return to training of an individual
worker is equal to R(µ) = °(µ) ¡ µ: Although the return to the worker is
type dependent, it is clear that the analysis of period one given above is
una®ected by adding period two; the worker appropriates the entire return
to training, R; in period two, while the period two pro¯t of the ¯rm is not
changed. Thus, the period one results still applies{ ¯rms will o®er subsidized
training in order to attract better workers in period one, even though they
are unable to exploit these workers in period two.
3.2 Ability unobserved by outside ¯rms, unexploitable
by the inside ¯rm
Now consider the case where individual productivity is not observable by the
outside ¯rms and where also the inside ¯rm is unable to pay di®erent wages
to workers of the same skill level. This could arise because the internal ¯rm
also does not observe worker ability, or because of its inability to di®erentiate
wages, for the reasons that we have set out earlier. Here we must also rule
out the possibility that ¯rms combine a higher wage o®er with the use of
selective dismissals of workers of lower quality. However, all ¯rms can observe
whether a worker is skilled or not, i.e. whether the worker received any
training in period one, and can also di®erentiate wages according to skill
level. In equilibrium, ¯rms will o®er both groups a wage equal to their
expected productivity. Thus, the wage for unskilled workers, wU, will be
given by
w
U = E [µjµ < µ(¸)] (11)
while the wage for skilled workers, wS, will be given by
w
S = E [°(µ)jµ ¸ µ(¸)] (12)
Thus the wage premium for skilled workers equals the di®erence in average
productivity between the two types of worker, with the ¯rm getting no share
of the increase in productivity induced by training. As in case 1 above, this
implies that the period one analysis given in section 2 above is not a®ected:
14¯rms have an incentive to o®er subsidized training arising from the period
one e®ect on selection of workers.
However, a novel point is that the individual return to training for a
worker is, on average, greater than the increase in productivity caused by
training. To see this as simply as possible, assume that there is no comple-
mentarity between ability and training so that °(µ) = µ+Z: In this case, the
return to training of an individual worker is
R = fE [µjµ ¸ µ(¸)] + Zg ¡ E [µjµ < µ(¸)] > Z (13)
The reason for this is straightforward { as in Spence, training acts as a
signal for higher ability, and thus workers have a greater incentive to un-
dertake it. A numerical example can illustrate this e®ect. Assume that µ
is uniformly distributed on [a;a + 1];a > 0, and where r = 0: The wage of
unskilled workers is wU = E(µjµ · µ(¸)) = a+
µ(¸)
2 ; while the wage of skilled
workers is wS = E(µjµ > µ(¸)) + Z = a +
1+µ(¸)
2 + Z: The wage premium,
wS ¡ wU = 1=2 + Z:
Thus, in this case there are two mechanisms that causes excessive training
relative to the socially optimal level. Firms subsidize training to attract the
more productive workers, and workers choose to train as a signal of higher
productivity. Note also that the signalling e®ect of training follows directly
from the feature that ¯rms use training as a screening role in period one. Put
di®erently, whenever ¯rms use training to screen workers in period one, the
screening will work as a signal in period two, and workers have an additional
incentive to choose training. This e®ect will exists unless the there is no
informational e®ect in period two of the screening in period 1 (as in the
¯rst case in this subsection, where we assumed that individual productivity
was observable in period two), or if there is no gain from the additional
information in period two (e.g. if the wages for skilled and unskilled for
some exogenous reason were assumed equal).
The results of our analysis so far are in sharp contrast to the results of
Acemoglu and Pischke [1], where ¯rms pay for general training because it
yields an increase in productivity that exceeds the increase in wages. Here
we see that the wage di®erential between skilled and unskilled exceeds the
increase in productivity that is caused by training, and nevertheless the ¯rms
pro¯t from paying for general training. This has clear implications for an-
alyzing the empirical evidence on di®erentials between skilled and unskilled
workers.
153.3 Ability observed and exploitable only by the inside
¯rm
The ¯nal case that we analyze is where the inside ¯rm observes the ability
of the worker while the outside ¯rm does not do so. Our model of the
second period is rather similar to Acemoglu and Pischke [1]. We assume
also that the inside ¯rm may condition its wage o®er upon the ability of
the worker. Competition for each worker is given by an English auction
or bidding war, where each ¯rm may raise its o®er in response to the o®er
of its rival. We may model this competition equivalently as a sealed bid
second price auction, where both ¯rms submit wage o®ers, and the worker
goes to the ¯rm submitting the highest o®er at the wage o®ered by the next
highest bidder. Outside ¯rms clearly su®er from the winner's curse in this
situation. (The only reason the inside ¯rm would let the outside ¯rm win
the bidding would be because the outside ¯rm o®ers more than the worker's
productivity.) Thus the equilibrium outside o®er for trained workers will be
°(µ(¸)); the productivity level of the lowest type of trained worker. Hence
all trained workers will be retained by the inside ¯rm, at a wage equal to
°(µ(¸)): The pro¯ts made by the ¯rm on trained workers in period two is
given by:
¼2T(¸) = E [°(µ)jµ ¸ µ(¸)] ¡ °(µ(¸)) (14)
Then consider wage determination for unskilled workers. If we assume
that untrained worker's ability is also similarly observed by the inside ¯rm,
they will also be retained by the inside ¯rm at a wage equal to the produc-
tivity of the lowest type, a: Thus the pro¯ts on unskilled workers in period
two is given by
¼2U(¸) = E [µjµ < µ(¸)] ¡ a (15)
Thus we see that period two pro¯ts may be greater for skilled or unskilled
workers, depending on whether the dispersion of abilities above the lower
bound is larger in the former group or the later. Note also that in contrast to
cases 1 and 2 above, the inside ¯rm does make excess pro¯t in period two by
exploiting its informational advantage relative to outside ¯rms about workers'
ability. This informational advantage will clearly a®ect ¯rms' wage o®ers in
period one. A ¯rm's pro¯ts over the two periods (neglecting discounting)
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Workers' return from training in period one is a higher wage in period
two, given by
R = °(µ(¸)) ¡ a (18)
Taking into consideration period two does not a®ect the qualitative anal-
ysis of period one given above. The screening motivation for providing sub-
sidized general training still applies, so ¯rms will o®er subsidized training
even if there are no additional bene¯ts to be reaped in period two. However,
if period two pro¯ts are greater for skilled workers, ¼2T(¸) > ¼2U(¸), ¯rms'
incentive to subsidize training in period one is strengthened. This additional
e®ect is similar to Acemoglu and Pischke's [1] argument of training yielding
an informational advantage.
There are many reasons to suppose that productivity dispersion is greater
for skilled workers. In addition, it may be harder for the inside ¯rm to exploit
its superior information in the case of untrained workers than for trained
workers. In the case of unskilled workers, such exploitation may require a
wage reduction in period two, from the level E [µjµ < µ(¸)] to a: On the other
hand, for skilled workers, such exploitation can be achieved even with a wage
increase which re°ects their higher productivity. This may be an additional
reason why period two pro¯ts are greater from trained workers.
Let us conclude our analysis of this case by considering the case where
training and ability are not complementary in production, so that °(µ) =
µ + Z: In this case we note that all increases in productivity due to training
will accrue to the worker. Nevertheless, the ¯rm may make higher pro¯ts
on trained workers than on untrained if productivity dispersion is greater for
skilled workers. In any event, ¯rms still have an incentive to train in order to
induce a positive selection. This is in contrast with the results of Acemoglu
and Pischke [1], where in the separable case, ¯rms have no incentive to train.
To summarize, we have explored several di®erent scenarios of second pe-
riod labor market competition for trained workers. For reasons of signalling,
workers have greater incentives to train in a dynamic context. Although
17¯rms may be able to make greater pro¯ts from trained workers, this is not
necessary for them to o®er training in the ¯rst place. Indeed, we ¯nd that
¯rms may o®er training even though the wages of trained workers rise by
more than the increase in productivity induced by such training.
4 Empirical Implications and Evidence
At the more general level, both our idea here and the idea of Acemoglu and
Pischke [2] explain ¯rm-provision of general training by wage compression.
However, there are also crucial di®erences. In Acemoglu and Pischke [2], wage
compression is across skill levels, so that training leads to a smaller increase
in the wage than in productivity. In other words, ¯rms pay for training
in order to exploit future di®erences in productivity. In our model, there
is wage compression within skill levels, between workers of di®erent ability,
and ¯rms o®er cheap or free training so as to attract the more productive
workers. In other words, training works as a screening device, paid for by
current productivity di®erences. There is no need for the wage increase
induced by training to be smaller than the increase in productivity induced by
training; indeed, under plausible assumptions the wage premium can exceed
the productivity increase associated with training as training may involve a
signal of higher innate productivity.
In more practical terms, the theory of Acemoglu and Pischke would sug-
gest that ¯rm-provided general training will take place in environments where
the worker's return to training is small, for example in countries where skill
premia are small. In contrast, our theory suggest that ¯rm-provided training
will take place in environments where ¯rms for some reason are constrained
in di®erentiating pay between individuals of di®erent ability not directly re-
lated to training. For example, one could think of countries or environments
where the wage distribution is compressed also when one compare workers
of the same observational characteristics, including education and training
levels.
Acemoglu and Pischke [2] use German ¯rms' provision of ¯rm-sponsored
general training in the form of apprenticeships as a leading example of their
theory. However, while there is strong evidence that wages are generally
more compressed in Germany than in the US, the evidence in Freeman and
Schettkat [9] show that the wage increase from unskilled to skill level II (some
18college/ hauptschule + apprenticeship/meister) is in fact greater in Germany
(Table 2), casting some doubt on the claim that wages are more compressed
across skills in Germany than in the US. However, the residual in a standard
wage equation, is greater in the US than in Germany. This suggests that
there is more wage compression among workers of the same observational
skill level in Germany than in the US. Within our model this would suggests
more ¯rm-provided general training in Germany than the US.
A recent empirical study by Brunello [12] is also relevant in this context.
Brunello calculates measures of wage compression within groups that are
sorted according to country, occupation, sector and age. He then ¯nds a
signi¯cant positive relationship between wage compression and ¯rm-provided
general training, over a sample with the associated groups. It is however not
clear whether this wage compression should be interpreted as relating to
individuals of di®erent training levels (the Acemoglu and Pischke's story) or
individuals of di®erent productivity levels not directly related to training (our
story). Thus, Brunello's evidence is consistent with either of the hypotheses,
and can not be used to distinguish between them.
There is also evidence showing that ¯rms are more likely to provide train-
ing in the public sector, and in unionized sectors, cf. OECD [27], see e.g.
tables 3.11 and 3.12. This is also consistent with either of the stories, as
wages generally are more compressed both in the public sector and in union-
ized sectors, cf. Gregory and Borland ([19]) and Wallerstein ([30]).
Autor[5] discusses why temporary help supply (THS) establishments pro-
vide free training in portable computer skills. A basic assumption in Autor's
model is that training is more productive and therefore more valuable for
high productive workers. As in our model, ¯rms o®er training to induce self-
selection so as to attract high ability workers. However, in contrast to our
model, ¯rms pro¯t from doing this by obtaining an informational advantage
about the ability of the workers, which then can be exploited by o®ering
wages below marginal productivity. A key point in Autor's story is that
¯rms performing training will observe worker ability, whereas non-training
¯rms will not. Autor justi¯es this assumption by the empirical feature that
the training provided by ¯rms began and ended with assessment. How-
ever, against this justi¯cation one can argue that other ¯rms at fairly low
cost can perform the same assessment that the training ¯rms performed.
Furthermore, one would expect that also non-training ¯rms would obtain
information about the ability of their employees on the basis of possible re-
ports and reactions from the clients of the THS ¯rms, where the employees
19actually work. Our model o®ers an alternative interpretation of why THS
establishments provide free general training: Because THS ¯rms initially are
unable to observe worker ability, and thus unable to di®erentiate the wage
accordingly, free training is o®ered to attract the high ability workers (as-
suming that training is more valuable or less costly to high ability workers).
As shown in our model, this may constitute a su±cient motivation for ¯rms
to provide general training, and no ex-post informational advantage of the
incumbent ¯rm is necessary.
Our paper is closely related to Cappelli [13], who asks the question, why
do employers pay for the college education of their employees.5 It documents
substantial payment for college education, and argues that employers do this
in order to improve employee quality and reduce turnover. The empirical
evidence shows that provision of tuition assistance improves the quality of
hires, much as in the model of this paper. Cappelli's paper is indeed comple-
mentary to ours { while we have focused on a theoretical analysis of a labor
market where training helps select better workers, his paper shows that such
a mechanism is empirically important. The model presented in this paper
may help better understand this empirical evidence. For example, Cappelli
suggests that tuition assistance is so common that the employers o®ering it
may not be able to induce positive self-selection. In terms of our model, this
is not a puzzle, since in symmetric equilibrium all employers o®er assistance,
but the average quality of hires is the same as in the situation where no one
o®ers assistance. Nevertheless, it is optimal for an individual employer to
o®er assistance since otherwise better quality workers would go to the other
employers.
Our explanation is consistent with survey evidence based on in-depth
interviews of 11 Norwegian ¯rms, Larsen et al. ([22], chapter 6). A few of the
¯rms had a recruitment strategy with emphasis on a good apprentice system
and an explicit aim of being viewed as a ¯rm oriented towards competence
among its employees. Almost all ¯rms expressed a desire to have employees
who themselves took a responsibility for his/her own task and development,
and individual initiative to training was viewed as a signal that the employee
was of the type that the ¯rm was interested in. Finally, in all ¯rms the salary
was basically associated with the job, either through collective agreements
or job descriptions, while any individual variation was negligible.
To conclude, our basic argument is if employers are unable to di®erentiate
5We came across his paper after having written the ¯rst versions of ours.
20wages according to worker ability, for informational or institutional reasons,
this will provide employers with an incentive to provide subsidized general
training to attract the more able workers. Under fairly weak conditions,
labor market equilibrium will always involve some subsidization of general
training. Furthermore, the introduction of a minimum wage will increase
¯rms' subsidization of training. In contrast to existing popular explanations
, ¯rms may bene¯t from subsidizing training even if they do not capture any
of the return from training in the form of a productivity increase exceeding
the associated wage increase. Our explanation for the ¯rm provision of train-
ing appears consistent with available evidence, and can be viewed as being
complementary to existing theories.
5 Appendix
We now prove theorem 1. We have already proved the characterization results
in the text of the paper, so it remains to prove existence of equilibrium.
Consider the function Á(¸) de¯ned on [0;1] by
Á(¸) = E[µjµ ¸ µ(¸)] ¡ E[µjµ < µ(¸)] ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)k (19)
Since the probability distribution over productivities is atomless, (being
given by the density f); the conditional expectations are continuous functions
of ¸: Thus Á is a continuous function. We have assumed that when ¸ = 1;
µ(1) = µ
¤¤ is in the interior of [a;b]: Thus Á(¸) > 0 if ¸ is su±ciently close to
1; since the di®erence in conditional expectations between workers who train
and those who do not is strictly positive.
From our characterization results, a necessary condition for the pair
(w;¸);¸ > 0; to be an equilibrium pro¯le is that Á(¸) = 0:
Let us de¯ne ^ ¸ as follows. If Á(0) ¸ 0; let ^ ¸ = 0: Otherwise, let ^ ¸ denote
the smallest value of ¸ such that Á(¸) = 0: (Continuity of Á ensures that ^ ¸
is well de¯ned, and lies in the unit interval).
We now show that there is an equilibrium provided that two or more
¯rms o®er the pair ( ^ w; ^ ¸); where ^ w is the wage which ensures zero pro¯ts,
i.e. ^ w = ¹ µ ¡ [1 ¡ F(µ(^ ¸))](1 ¡ ^ ¸)k:
Clearly, this pair satis¯es the su±cient conditions in the characterization
results. If any ¯rm o®ers a lower subsidy to training, then this is not prof-
itable since at ^ ¸, workers who train are at least as pro¯table as those who do
21not. If ^ ¸ > 0; then a ¯rm which o®ers a higher subsidy will attract all the
better workers, but this is also not pro¯table.
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